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Respondent/ Appellee. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from, an order granting the State's motion to dismiss a post-
conviction petition for determination of factual innocence (addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f) West 
2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Did the court err by granting the state's motion to dismiss the 
postconviction petition for determination of factual innocence without holding an 
evidentiary hearing that would have duplicated a prior 23B factual hearing? 
Standard of Review. "We review an appeal from an order dismissing or 
denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the 
lower court's conclusions of law/7 Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ^ 8, 194 P.3d 913 
(citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal: 
• Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence - Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-401 through § 78B-9-405 (West 2008). The text is contained in 
Addendum B. 
• Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C - the text is contained in Addendum C 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 18, 2003, the State charged petitioner Miller with one count of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1999)§ (R2. 3).1 A jury convicted Miller as charged, and the trial court sentenced 
him to a prison term of five years to life (R2. 83,136). Miller filed a timely appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court (R2.139). That court transferred the case to the Utah Court 
of Appeals (R2.154). 
While his appeal was pending, Miller filed a motion under rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to remand his case to supplement the record with 
evidence to support his appellate claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (R2. 
160-212). Specifically, Miller asserted that his counsel failed to conduct a reasonable 
1
 This brief refers to the record in this civil case, no. 080907781, as "R," and to 
the record in the criminal case, no. 031901163FS, as //R2.// 
2 
investigation of his alibi and that, but for his counsel's alleged failure, the jury 
would have acquitted him (R2.164-67). 
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Miller, 
Miller's trial counsel, Miller's former appellate counsel, and Miller's niece, Berthella, 
testified (R2. 610 & 611). The trial court made findings of fact and concluded that 
Miller's trial counsel was not ineffective (addendum D, R13-26). 
Nevertheless, on appeal, the parties agreed that there was an error in the trial 
proceedings and that the interests of justice dictated that Miller receive a new trial 
(addendum E, R27-29). They therefore filed a stipulated motion for summary 
reversal. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded the case 
to the Third District Court for a new trial (R30). 
In the district court, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the case and the 
trial court dismissed all charges "in the interest of justice." (addendum F). Miller 
was released from custody the same day (R137). 
The following year, Miller filed his petition for determination of factual 
innocence (Rl-54). The State filed its answer to the petition (R61-63) and a motion to 
dismiss (R64-134). Miller filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss (R135-158). The State filed a reply (R161-166). On September 30,2008, the 
court entered an order granting the State's motion to dismiss (R171-173). Miller 
timely appealed (R180). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Robbeiy 
On the morning of December 8, 2000, Julia Smart was robbed at knifepoint 
outside a Stop 'n Go on 610 North 400 West in Salt Lake City (R2. 158:49, 52-54). 
The assailant took her purse and attempted to take her car (R2.158:54-56). When he 
was unable to shift the car from park into reverse, he left the car and fled on foot 
(R2.158:61). 
Julia described her assailant as a black man, approximately five feet eight 
inches tall, with a medium build (R2. 158:62). He had a goatee with graying 
towards the bottom, high cheekbones, and "very distinctive77 eyes (R2.158:62). She 
described his skin color as not dark black, "but an average black man" (R2.158:62).2 
When the assailant first accosted Julia, he grabbed her and mumbled 
something she could not understand (R2.158:52-53). He mumbled a couple of more 
times before Julia understood that he was saying, "I'll cut you" (R2.158:53). Julia 
looked down and saw that he had a knife pointed at her throat (R2.158:54). Julia 
released her grip on her purse and the assailant took it (R2.158:54). He then turned 
and jumped into the driver's seat of Julia's car, which she had left running (R2. 
158:54-55). 
2
 A police report filed after the incident stated that Julia had described her 
assailant as eighteen to twenty-one years old (R2. 158:63). At trial, Julia did not 
remember telling the police this and believed it was a mistake (R2.158:53). 
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Julia ran into the Stop 'n Go and reported the robbery to the store clerk (R2. 
158:55). The clerk immediately called the police (R2.158:55,91). Julia and the clerk 
then returned to her car to find the robber ''fumbling77 around inside it (R2.158:55). 
He was "messing with the lights and the windshield wiper blades and the buttons 
on the dashboard77 in an apparent attempt to get the car into reverse (R. 158:55). 
During this time, Julia stood on the passenger side of the car and observed the 
person who robbed her through the windshield (R2.158:56-58). She had no trouble 
seeing him because it was dawn, and the Stop 'n Go was well lit from overhead 
lights outside the store and on the gas pumps (R2.158:59). Julia estimated that she 
stood outside her car watching him for two to five minutes (R2.158:59). She stated, 
"He was in my car for quite a while77 (R2.158:59). 
The Stop 'n Go clerk, Ron Nissen, also observed the robber fumbling about in 
Julia's car (R2.158:91-94). Ron noted that the lighting outside was "pretty good77 
(R2. 158:93). He observed the robber from the front of the car and then moved 
around to the driver's side and watched him from three feet away for about a 
minute (R2. 158:57, 92-93). At one point, they looked at each other through the 
driver's side window, and Ron said, "I don't know why you're doing this, but it's 
not going to get you anywhere, you're just going to get caught" (R2.158:94). At that 
point, the robber jumped out of the car and ran off (R2.158:94). 
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The subsequent police investigation yielded no immediate results (R2.158:61). 
During the months following the robbery, Julia did not go back to the Stop 'n Go 
and would not look others in the face for fear that she would see the robber again 
(R2. 158:68). A few times after the robbery, she thought she saw the man who 
robbed her, but she never reported the sightings to the police because she "wasn't 
ever 100 percent sure" (R2.158:68). 
Two Years Later 
On February 14, 2003, as part of a separate investigation of a different crime, 
police showed Julia a photo lineup containing Miller's photo (R2. 158:94). She 
immediately expressed excitement and surprise and identified Miller as the man 
who robbed her (R2.158:64, 83). Later, on April 24,2003, Julia attended a live line-
up at the Salt Lake County Jail (R2.158:65). Julia again identified Miller as the man 
who robbed her (R2.158:66). 
Ron Nissen also identified Miller in a photo line-up (R2.158:94-95). 
Miller's Alibi 
At trial, Miller testified that in December 2000 he was living and working in 
Louisiana (R2.158:45-46,103). Miller and the State stipulated to the following facts: 
1. That Harry Miller was employed by the Ten M. Corporation on 
[sic] Donaldsonville, Louisiana, from the end of May 2000 until 
February 2002. Further, that Harry Miller was on medical leave from 
November 25, 2000 until December 13, 2000. 
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2. On November 25,2000, Harry Miller was admitted into the River 
West Medical Center for a cerebrovascular accident with Boca's 
aphasia (commonly known as a stroke) and released from the River 
West Medical Center. 
(R2. 40; 158:110). 
Miller's stroke caused the entire right side of his body to go "dead" on him 
(R2.158:105). He had trouble speaking and had to move in with his sister until he 
recovered (R2.158:105-06). Miller claimed that on December 8,2000, the date of the 
robbery, his speech was still "mumbled/7 and he had a nurse who visited him to 
help him learn to speak (R2.158:108). 
Miller admitted that he had lived in Salt Lake City from 1989 to 1999 (R2. 
158:103). He also admitted that his brother, Wilbert, lived in Salt Lake City and that 
he had occasionally lived with his brother (R2. 158:107). Wilbert was present at 
Miller's trial but Miller did not call him as a witness (R2.158:107). 
In closing argument, the State pointed out that, although Miller was living in 
Louisiana at the time of the robbery, nobody could account for his whereabouts 
between November 28, 2000, and December 13, 2000 (R2. 158:134). The State 
explained that this time gap allowed Miller time to travel to Salt Lake City to visit 
his brother, commit the robbery, and return to Louisiana (R2.158:114-15). The State 
also noted that the effects of Miller's stroke were likely mild as he was released from 
the hospital after only four days (R2.158:114-15). 
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The jury convicted Miller (R2. 83). Miller appealed, and his case was 
remanded to the trial court to supplement the record with evidence relevant to 
Miller's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (R2. 252-54). 
The Rule 23B Hearing 
On September 26, 2005, the trial court held a rule 23B hearing at which the 
court heard testimony from Miller's attorneys and scheduled a continuation of the 
hearing to hear testimony from Miller's niece, Berthella (R2. 610:50; 611:8). Berthella 
traveled to Utah by bus and appeared at the hearing at which Miller also testified 
(R2. 611). 
At the September 26th hearing, Miller's first appellate attorney, Kent Hart, 
testified that after receiving the case from trial counsel and reviewing it, he decided 
to further investigate Miller's alibi claim (R2. 610:9). He discovered hospital records 
in the case file that showed that Miller was picked up from the hospital by his niece, 
Berthella Miller, and his employer, Lisa Snyder (R2. 610:10). Nothing in the records 
indicated that Berthella and Ms. Snyder had any role in caring for Miller other than 
picking him up from the hospital (R2. 610:17). Mr. Hart located Ms. Snyder's 
number and called her (R2. 610:19-20). She gave him a telephone number for 
Berthella Miller (R2. 610:11). Mr. Hart then called Berthella Miller, who stated that 
she had helped care for Miller after his stroke (R2. 610:11). 
8 
Mr. Hart also discovered in the hospital records a treatment plan by a home 
healthcare agency (R2. 610:13). He did not discover which agency had administered 
the plan or which nurses had cared for Miller (R2. 610:13). Instead he turned the 
case over to outside counsel (R2. 610:13). 
After Mr. Hart's testimony, the State and Miller stipulated to the admission of 
affidavits from Melissa Landry, the records custodian of River West Home 
Healthcare, and Beverly Kolder, a nurse from River West Home Healthcare who 
visited Miller (R2. 610:22-23). The parties also stipulated to the admission of 
Miller's medical records from River West Home Healthcare, which were attached to 
Ms. Kolder's affidavit (R2. 610:23). Those records established that Ms. Kolder had 
visited Miller on December 7,2000 at 11:00 a.m. and December 14,2000 (R2. 610:23; 
Defense Exhibit 3). The records also established that Miller had missed visits on 
December 4, 2000, December 6, 2000, and December 11, 2000 (R2. 610:24; State's 
Exhibits 2-3). 
The State then presented testimony from Miller's trial counsel, John 
O'Connell, Jr. (R2. 610:27). Mr. O'Connell stated that Miller had suggested an alibi 
defense, but that he was only able to provide the name of the company he was 
working for and the name and a partial address for his sister, Paula Miller (R2. 
610:28). Miller did not tell Mr. O'Connell about his niece, Berthella. In addition, 
Miller could not remember the name of the hospital or the home healthcare agency 
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that treated him, nor could he remember the name of the nurses who cared for him 
(R2.610:30-31,36). Mr. O'Connell testified that Miller's "memory of this whole time 
was not the best/' and he could not recall Miller naming any other alibi witnesses 
besides Paula (R2. 610:31). 
Mr. O'Connell mailed a letter to Paula's partial address (R2. 610:28-29). Paula 
responded to the letter and was initially very cooperative (R2.610:29). She provided 
contact information for Miller's former employer, tracked down the hospital where 
he was treated, and agreed to testify at trial that she had cared for him during the 
two weeks he recovered from his stroke (R2. 610:30). With Paula's help, Mr. 
O'Connell was able to obtain Miller's hospital records (R2. 610:42). Mr. O'Connell 
was not able to determine from those records which home health care agency Miller 
had used (R2. 610:36). 
At some point before the trial, Paula changed her mind (R2. 610:30). She 
refused to travel to Utah to testify and was "very emphatic about it" (R2. 610:30). 
Mr. O'Connell asked Paula, "Can you tell me of anybody else or anyone who could 
[come out], instead of bringing you out, can you provide me with somebody else 
who could do it?" (R2. 610:30). Paula replied that she could not (R2. 610:30). 
Mr. O'Connell decided not to try to force Paula to come out by subpoena 
because he believed that Miller's "alibi at the time was pretty strong" (R2. 610:44). 
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He was also concerned that Paula might become a hostile witness if he forced her to 
travel to Utah for the trial (R2. 610:45). 
At the continuation of the evidentiary hearing, Miller testified that he told Mr. 
O'Connell about Berthella and the visits from the home healthcare nurse (R2. 611:5-
6). He admitted, however, that at the time of trial he did not know Berthella7 s phone 
number and did not know where Berthella was living (R2. 611:9). He also did not 
know the nurse's name or the name of the home health care agency that treated him 
(R2. 611:6-7). 
Berthella also testified (R2. 611:13). She asserted that she was living with 
Paula and Miller after Miller's stroke (R2. 611:13-14). Berthella admitted, however, 
that she had previously told counsel for the state that at the time Miller had his 
stroke, she was not living with Paula, and that she lived a couple of minutes away 
(R2. 611:23). Berthella stated, "[a]t that time I had moved out. And I said I had 
moved out but I were [sic] living with her." (R2. 611:23). When asked again if she 
had previously said that she was not living with Paula when Miller was recovering 
from his stroke, Berthella said, "I think so. I don't know. I been having so many 
questions asked. But I was living there at the time, then I moved out." (R2. 611:23). 
Berthella testified that she saw Miller every day after work while he was 
recovering from his stroke (R2. 611:15). But on cross-examination, she admitted that 
she sometimes worked a double shift and that it was possible that while Miller was 
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recovering from his stroke, she might have been at work from four in the morning 
until eleven at night (R2. 611:27). She admitted therefore that on at least one day she 
might not have seen him because she was at work until late at night (R2. 611:28). 
Eight months before the hearing, Berthella signed an affidavit in which she 
attested to the date Miller was admitted to the hospital, the date she brought him 
home from the hospital, the time period he lived with Paula, and the date Miller 
returned to work. She could not, however, remember any of those dates at the 
hearing (R2. 611:15-16, 24-26). When questioned about her memory lapse at the 
hearing, she replied, "I didn't remember. Fm sorry. I didn't remember/7 (R2. 
611:25). 
The trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R13-26). It 
ruled that John O'Connell was not deficient for failing to locate Miller's home 
healthcare records or Miller's niece, Berthella (R24-25). It determined that Miller 
and his sister had not provided Mr. O'Connell with enough information to locate 
the records or to contact Berthella and had not told him of Berthella's importance 
(R24-25). Specifically, it found that neither Miller nor his sister had provided Mr. 
O'Connell with the name of the home healthcare agency that cared for Miller or the 
names of any nurses that visited him (R15). It also found that the agency and nurses 
were not identified in Miller's hospital records (R15). The court further found that 
while Berthella was mentioned briefly in the hospital records, neither Miller nor his 
12 
sister told Mr. O'Connell of Berthella's whereabouts or that she had helped care for 
Miller (R19-20). 
The court ruled that Miller suffered no prejudice from his counsel's conduct. 
It determined that "in light of the other facts and evidence establishing defendant's 
guilt, including the credibility of the two eye witnesses who testified at trial, there is 
no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial" (R25-26). It noted that 
Miller's home healthcare records did not establish a complete alibi and that Miller 
"could have traveled by airplane from Louisiana to Utah . . . in time to rob Julia 
Smar t . . ." (R17, 24).3 
The court also found that" [B]ecause of her inconsistent statements and lack of 
memory about crucial information, testimony from Berthella Miller at the 
evidentiary hearing was not credible," and that "[testimony from Berthella Miller 
fails to establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial." (R24). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner failed to meet the requirements of the Postconviction Determination 
of Factual Innocence statute, because his evidence was not newly discovered, his 
counsel was not ineffective, and his evidence failed to prove that he was factually 
innocent. The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to establish his factual 
3
 The court's findings, which the State drafted, mistakenly stated that Miller 
could have traveled from Louisiana to Utah in December 2005 rather than December 
2000 (R17). 
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innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner's proffered evidence was 
insufficient to meet that burden. The district court correctly determined that it was 
not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing when the evidence petitioner relied on 




THE PETITIONER DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE FACTUAL INNOCENCE STATUTE 
Petitioner claims that his evidence shows that he is factually innocent (pet/s 
brief at 10). He also alleges that the law should be read to give every chance to an 
innocent person to be compensated for unjustified imprisonment (pet/s brief at 17). 
But the first and most important requirement of the factual innocence statute is that 
the person must be able to prove factual innocence - and petitioner has failed to 
meet that requirement. 
A. The Statutory Requirements 
In 2008 the legislature passed the Postconviction Determination of Factual 
Innocence statute. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-401 through 405. The purpose of the 
statute is to financially compensate one who can prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that he is factually innocent and was wrongly imprisoned. Id., and see 
addendum H, Exoneration and Assistance Bill: Senate Floor Debate on S.B. 16,2008 Utah 
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Leg. Gen. Session, Jan. 22,2008 (statement of Senator Gregory Bell, chief sponsor of 
the bill (0:11 -15:28). The statute imposes specific, narrow, requirements that must 
be met in order for a petitioner to be entitled to financial compensation. A 
petitioner must assert under oath that he is factually innocent. Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-402(2)(a). In addition, "[t]he burden is upon the petitioner to establish the 
petitioner's factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence/7 Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-9-404(l)(b). 
A person may petition for a hearing to determine factual innocence only if the 
petition alleges the following information: 
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes 
that the petitioner is factually innocent; 
(ii) the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner 
claims establishes innocence; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence 
that was known; 
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
evidence demonstrates that the petitioner is factually 
innocent; and 
(vi)(A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to 
include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion 
or postconviction motion, and the evidence could not have 
been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 
to exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence; 
or 
(C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) 
or (2)(a)(vi)(B) in the interest of justice. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a). 
Once the petition is filed, the State must answer or otherwise respond. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(6)(a). After the pleadings are closed, "the court shall order a 
hearing if it finds there is a bona fide issue as to whether the petitioner is factually 
innocent of the charges of which the petitioner was convicted/' Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-402(6)(b)(i).4 If there is no bona fide issue as to whether the petitioner is 
factually innocent, a hearing is not required. Here, the district court determined 
that the petitioner had "not made the required showing for a hearing/' (R172). 
In making its determination of factual innocence, the court may consider 
various types of evidence. 
(2) The court may consider: 
(a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a 
criminal trial; and 
(b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay 
in evaluating its weight and credibility. 
(3) In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to 
the evidence presented at the hearing under this part, all the evidence 
presented at the original trial and at any postconviction proceedings in the 
case. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-404(2)&(3). 
"If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is 
factually innocent, the court may find the petitioner is factually innocent without 
holding a hearing/' Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(6)(b)(ii). 
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If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is 
factually innocent, it shall order that the conviction be vacated and expunged. Utah 
Code Ann. §78B-9-404(4). After considering all of the evidence, if the court does not 
determine by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent 
it shall deny the petition. Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-404(5). 
B. The petitioner does not meet the statutory requirements to 
establish factual innocence. 
This case is not about whether petitioner was entitled to a new trial. This case 
is about whether the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was 
factually innocent. To be entitled to compensation under the factual innocence 
statute, a petitioner must be able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he 
was wrongly convicted and sent to prison for a crime that he can prove he did not 
commit. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 through 405. Petitioner does not meet those 
requirements. 
The petition does not allege newly discovered material evidence. All of the 
evidence petitioner relies upon was known to petitioner or his counsel at the time of 
trial, and petitioner's counsel has already been found not to be ineffective. In 
addition, some of the evidence petitioner relies upon is merely cumulative of 
evidence presented at trial. Finally, even if petitioner's evidence were newly 
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discovered, when it is viewed with all the other evidence, it does not demonstrate 
that the petitioner is factually innocent. 
1. Petitioner's evidence is not newly discovered. 
After the petition was filed, the State filed an answer and a motion to dismiss. 
The State argued that petitioner failed to assert newly discovered material evidence 
in support of his petition, as required under Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2) (a)(1). 
Petitioner's memorandum in support of his petition refers to the affidavit of Beverly 
Kolder, a registered nurse involved in providing home health care to petitioner in 
Louisiana (R51-52). It also refers to "additional testimony as to an alibi defense/7 
but it never specifies what that additional testimony is (R50-51). 
In his opposition to the State's motion to dismiss, petitioner attempted to 
expand his assertions. He stated that the new evidence which establishes his 
innocence consists of 1) the affidavit of Beverly Kolder, a registered nurse who 
provided home health care to petitioner in Louisiana on December 7th and 14th, 2000 
(R137-138); 2) the testimony of Berthella Miller5 that she had seen petitioner every 
day during the three weeks he was out of work (R138); and 3) that petitioner was in 
court in Louisiana on December 5, 2000 for fishing without a license (R138). 
5
 Petitioner refers to the testimony of "Defendant's sister." (R138). However, 
petitioner's sister did not testify. It appears that petitioner is actually referring to 
the testimony of his niece, Berthella Miller. 
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None of this evidence is "new." To support his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in the prior 23B remand, petitioner consistently argued that defense 
counsel knew of the home health visits and of other alibi witnesses, in order to 
argue that counsel should have investigated further and produced the witnesses at 
trial (R83-94). At the 23B evidentiary hearing, petitioner testified that he told his 
trial attorney about his niece, Berthella, and about the home health care people who 
visited him (Rl28-129). In petitioner's rule 23B motion for remand, he stated that 
"although trial counsel had in his file, and Miller communicated to trial counsel the 
existence of court records showing Miller's presence in court in Louisiana on 
December 5th, 2000, trial counsel did not attempt to introduce said records at trial/7 
(addendum G, pp. 6-7). Petitioner's claim that he has presented newly discovered 
material evidence is contrary to his previous position that this evidence is not new. 
In addition, petitioner's evidence fails as a matter of law to meet the statutory 
definition of newly discovered evidence. As the district court correctly noted in its 
ruling, petitioner's claims do not meet subsection (vi)(A), requiring newly 
discovered evidence. Petitioner's claims do not qualify as newly discovered 
evidence because petitioner was aware of the substance of the evidence at the time 
of trial Petitioner knew that he was treated in Louisiana by a home health care 
nurse. He also knew whether his niece Berthella cared for and/or lived with him 
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following his stroke. He also knew that he went to court in Louisiana on December 
5, 2000, for the charge of fishing without a license. 
Because petitioner knew all of this information prior to trial, it is not "newly 
discovered/' It does not meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-
402(2)(a)(vi)(A), that "neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence could 
not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence." 
2. Petitioner's counsel was not ineffective. 
Even if evidence does not qualify as newly discovered, it may meet the factual 
innocence statutory requirements if counsel were ineffective for failing to uncover it. 
A person may petition the court for a hearing to establish factual innocence if the 
petition alleges that "a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-
402(2)(a)(vi)(B). 
Petitioner does not meet this requirement, because following the 23B hearing, 
the district court found that trial counsel was not ineffective (R24-26). Therefore, 
petitioner does not meet the requirement of Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(B), 
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that "a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise 
reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence/' 
3. The evidence presented by petitioner does not prove that he is 
factually innocent. 
The factual innocence statute provides that a court may waive the 
requirements of subsections (2)(a)(vi)(A) or (B) in the interests of justice. Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(C). In other words, a court could decide to allow a 
petitioner to proceed in the interests of justice, even if he did not present newly 
discovered evidence, and counsel was not found ineffective. However, the district 
court specifically decided not to waive these requirements (R172). The interests of 
justice did not require that these subsections be waived because petitioner also 
could not establish that his evidence was not merely cumulative, or, when viewed 
with all the other evidence, that it demonstrated that he was factually innocent. §§ 
78B-9-402(2)(a)(ii), (iii) & (v). 
The district court found that petitioner had not shown that the evidence was 
not merely cumulative of evidence already presented at trial (R172). Petitioner 
already presented an alibi defense at trial. As set out in the fact section above, 
petitioner testified at trial that at the time of the crime he was living and working in 
Louisiana (R2.158:45-46,103). The parties stipulated that petitioner was employed 
in Louisiana from May 2000 until February 2002, that he had a stroke on November 
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25,2000, and that he was on medical leave from November 25,2000 until December 
13, 2000 (R2.40; 158:110). Petitioner also testified at trial that after his stroke his 
speech was still "mumbled" and that he had a nurse who visited him to help him 
learn to speak (R2.158:108). The district court found that petitioner had not shown 
that the evidence presented in support of his factual innocence petition was not 
merely cumulative of evidence already presented at trial (R172). Therefore, 
petitioner failed to meet section 78B-9-402(2)(a)(iii). 
More importantly, petitioner failed to identify specific evidence that 
established his innocence, and when viewed with all the other evidence, the 
evidence he presented does not demonstrate that he is factually innocent. The 
district court stated that it had "reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the 
court of appeals and determined that there was 'no reasonable probability of a 
different outcome at trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified.'" (R172). 
In his brief, petitioner acknowledges that" [i]t still may be true that Defendant 
could conceivably have gotten on an airplane, come out to Utah, and robbed a 
stranger for a few dollars, nowhere near enough to pay for the airplane ticket; but at 
this point, everyone must concede that this does not make sense/' (pet/s brief at 
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24).6 Petitioner himself acknowledges that he could have committed this crime. 
Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof to establish by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that he is factually innocent. He is therefore not entitled to 
relief under the factual innocence statute. 
C. The petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that he is factually innocent. 
Petitioner claims that "the State must bear some burden to overcome the 
presumption of innocence." (pet/s brief at 25). However, petitioner is not entitled 
to a presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence only applies in a 
criminal action. "A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent 
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (West 2008); see also Coffin v. United States, 156 
U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394 (1895). A petition for post-conviction determination of 
factual innocence is not a criminal proceeding. It is a civil action. The rules of civil 
procedure apply. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(4). Therefore, the presumption of 
6
 The State does not concede that petitioner committing this crime does not 
make sense. Petitioner apparently believes that the crime would make sense only if 
there had been several hundred dollars in the victim's purse. But how much money 
a robber steals does not establish whether the crime made sense or not. A robber 
seldom knows beforehand how much money he is going to get when he steals a 
woman's purse. Petitioner also ignores the fact that, in addition to stealing the 
victim's purse, he also tried to steal her car - perhaps in order to drive back to 
Louisiana. 
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innocence does not apply to a petitioner who has filed a petition for the 
determination of factual innocence. 
The factual innocence statute provides that "[t]he burden is upon the 
petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by clear and convincing 
evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(l)(b). 
The petitioner brings this civil action by filing a petition for the determination 
of factual innocence. It is entirely his burden to establish his factual innocence by 
clear and convincing evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(l)(b). 
II. 
THE FACT THAT THE CONVICTION WAS REVERSED ON 
APPEAL AND THE CASE DISMISSED DOES NOT ESTABLISH 
PETITIONER'S INNOCENCE AND DOES NOT EXCUSE HIM 
FROM ANY OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
A. The fact that the conviction was reversed on appeal and the case 
has been dismissed is not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the factual innocence statute. 
Petitioner asserts that it "approaches the absurd to read this statute not to 
favor compensation where the conviction has been reversed on appeal, and the case 
has been dismissed/' (pet/s brief at 19-20). The statute must be read according to 
its terms. Nothing in the language of the statute establishes that a person is entitled 
to compensation merely because a conviction has been reversed on appeal or 
because a case has been dismissed. 
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The statute is clearly not meant to require the State to pay money to every 
petitioner whose conviction has been overturned. As the sponsor of the legislation, 
Senator Bell, stated in his summation when presenting the bill: 'The mere fact that 
the prisoner has been released from jail does not establish the right to have a claim 
under this fund." (addendum H, Exoneration and Assistance Bill: Senate Floor Debate 
on S.B. 16,2008 Utah Leg. Gen. Session, Jan. 22,2008 (statement of Senator Gregory 
Bell, chief sponsor of the bill) (15:28)). 
Cases are frequently reversed or dismissed for reasons that have nothing to 
do with whether the defendant is factually innocent. For example, cases may be 
reversed because of erroneous jury selection or instruction, prosecutorial 
misconduct, discovery violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, or errors in the 
admission or exclusion of evidence or testimony. Similarly, a case may be dismissed 
rather than being retried for numerous reasons that have nothing to do with 
whether the defendant is factually innocent. For example, a case may not be retried 
because of witness unavailability, because the victim does not want to go through 
another trial, or because the defendant has already served most of the originally 
imposed sentence. The fact that a case is reversed or dismissed does not establish 
that the defendant is innocent. Recognizing this fact, the legislature placed a high 
burden of proof - clear and convincing evidence - on those seeking compensation 
under the factual innocence statute. 
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When the State chose not to retry the case, it filed a motion to dismiss. The 
motion to dismiss stated that the District Attorney moved to dismiss "in the 
interests of justice/7 (addendum F). Petitioner asserts that "the State refused to take 
this case to retrial, based on newly discovered weaknesses in the evidence/' (pet.'s 
brief at 22-23). The statute sets out what is required to prove factual innocence and 
entitle a petitioner to compensation. Weakness in the evidence is not sufficient to 
meet the statutory requirements. Weakness in the evidence does not prove factual 
innocence and does not entitle a petitioner to financial compensation. 
Petitioner also contends that the credibility of the two eyewitnesses who 
testified at trial was "seriously questioned by both sides." (pet.'s brief at 23). This 
statement is not accurate. Nevertheless, even if true, the fact that eyewitness 
testimony is questioned does not establish factual innocence. Again, the statute sets 
out the necessary prerequisites for establishing factual innocence in order to be 
entitled to compensation. Questioning the credibility of witnesses is not one of 
them. 
In addition, the credibility of the victim's eyewitness testimony has never 
been questioned by the State. In support of his position that the credibility of the 
other eye witness was questioned, petitioner refers to an e-mail from the deputy 
district attorney which stated: "I have some concern that a third person identified 
your client as a former customer." (R156). All this establishes is that the deputy 
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district attorney had a question about the testimony. It does not establish that the 
identification of petitioner as the robber was incorrect. 
The eyewitness picked petitioner from a photo line-up. He also stated that he 
recognized petitioner as a "customer who came into the store once in a while/ ' 
(R154). Petitioner apparently believes that the eyewitness must be mistaken, 
because at the time of the crime, petitioner was living in Louisiana. However, 
petitioner admitted at trial that he previously lived in Salt Lake (R2. 158:103). 
Petitioner may have been a customer in the store when he lived in Salt Lake, or 
while he was in Salt Lake visiting his brother. In the alternative, the eyewitness may 
have correctly identified petitioner as the robber, even if he was mistaken about 
petitioner being a customer who came into the store. The fact that the deputy 
district attorney had some questions about this witnesses identification of petitioner 
as a customer does not establish that petitioner is innocent. 
The fact that the case was reversed on appeal does not establish that the 
petitioner is innocent. The fact that the State stipulated that there was an error in 
the trial proceedings, which justified a remand for a new trial, does not establish 
that the petitioner is innocent. The fact that the State chose not to proceed with the 
re-trial also does not establish that the petitioner is innocent. None of these facts 
meets the requirements of the factual innocence statute. 
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B. The fact that a conviction was reversed on appeal and the case has 
been dismissed does not excuse petitioner from any of the 
statutory requirements. 
Petitioner argues that 'Tie is not specifically restrained by the language of 
§78B-9-402((2)(a)." [sic] (pet/s brief at 21). Petitioner reasons that he should not be 
required to "show that the information regarding innocence was unknown to him or 
to his counsel at the time of the original trial [because] the results of that trial did not 
stand[]." (pet/s brief at 21). 
The factual innocence statute states that it applies to " [a] person wrho has been 
convicted of a felony offense." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a). Petitioner was 
convicted of a felony offense. The statute does not include any exceptions or special 
rules for petitioners whose convictions were reversed on appeal or whose cases 
were dismissed rather than being retried. 
The plain language of the statute establishes that the statute applies to 
everyone who files a petition for determination of factual innocence, regardless of 
the current status of their conviction. Under the plain language of the statute, there 
is no reason why petitioner would or should be excused from meeting any of the 
statutory requirements. 
Petitioner has stated no authority for his claim that parts of the statute do not 
apply to him, merely because his case was remanded for a new trial, and then no 
new trial was held. x\s stated above, there are numerous reasons why a conviction 
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might be reversed that have nothing to do with factual innocence. The fact that a 
conviction was reversed does not establish that parts of the factual innocence statute 
no longer apply. 
To the contrary, the factual innocence statute applies to any "person who has 
been convicted of a felony offense/7 Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(a). Therefore 
any person who was ever convicted of a felony offense in the State of Utah, and who 
can meet the requirements of the statute, may file a petition for determination of 
factual innocence at any time. Defendants still in custody may file a petition, 
whether or not their convictions were affirmed on appeal. Persons who have 
completed their sentence and been released from prison may file a petition. Persons 
whose convictions were reversed or remanded on appeal may file a petition. Even 
persons who have already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or reversed 
their conviction may filed a petition. Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(b). 
When engaging in statutory construction, "[w]e look first to the plain 
language of the statute to discern the legislative intent.'1 City of Salt Lake v. Salt Lake 
County, 925 P.2d 954,957 (Utah 1996)(citations omitted). "Where statutory language 
is plain and unambiguous, appellate courts cannot look beyond the language to 
divine legislative intent, but must construe the statute according to its plain 
language/7 State v. Paul 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993)(citing Bnnkerhoffv. 
Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)); see also Norman J. Singer, Sutherland 
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Statutory Construction § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992)(if statutory meaning is clear, court's 
sole function is to enforce statute according to its terms). 
Applying the fundamental rules of statutory interpretation, petitioner cannot 
establish that any of the statutory requirements do not apply to him, merely because 
his conviction was reversed and his case dismissed. The statutory reading 
petitioner urges upon this Court is contrary to the statute's plain and unambiguous 
language. Therefore, petitioner's claim that he should not be required to show that 
the information regarding innocence was unknown to him or to his counsel at the 
time of the original trial because the results of that trial did not stand, should be 
rejected. 
C. The fact that petitioner's evidence could have been presented at a 
retrial does not establish that he does not have to meet the 
requirements of the factual innocence statute. 
In support of his position that he should not be required to show that the 
information regarding innocence was unknown to him or his counsel at the time of 
trial, petitioner argues that if he had gone to retrial, he could have introduced all 
available evidence of his innocence, regardless of when and how it was discovered 
(pet.'s brief at 21). In other words, at a retrial, petitioner could have introduced 
evidence that does not qualify as newly discovered under the factual innocence 
statute. The State agrees (so long as the evidence met admissibility requirements). 
If a retrial had been held, petitioner may have been convicted again. On the other 
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hand, if a retrial had been held and petitioner had been acquitted, he would be in 
the same position he is in right now. An acquittal upon retrial would not 
necessarily establish that the petitioner was innocent. 
When a jury does not convict, they find the defendant "not guilty/' they do 
not make a finding of "innocent/7 Just as innocent people might be convicted, guilty 
people might be acquitted. A person may be acquitted not because they were 
innocent, but because there was reasonable doubt or insufficient evidence. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) ("There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a 
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant conviction."). 
"In ordinary law usage, the term not guilty is often considered to be 
synonymous with innocent. In American criminal jurisprudence, 
however, they are not totally synonymous. 'Not Guilty' is a legal 
finding by the jury that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof. 
A 'Not Guilty' verdict can result from either of two states of mind on 
the part of the jury: that they believe the defendant is factually innocent 
and did not commit the crime; or, although they do not necessarily 
believe he is innocent, and even 'tend' to believe he did commit the 
crime, the prosecution's case was not sufficiently strong to convince 
them of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Keeler, 238 Kan. 356, 362, 710 P.2d 1279,1285 (1985) (quoting Bugliosi, Not 
Guilty and Innocent: The Problem Children of Reasonable Doubt, Vol. 20, No. 2, Court 
Review 16 (1983)). 
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If petitioner had gone through a retrial and had been acquitted, he could have 
filed a petition for determination of factual innocence. However, he still would have 
had to meet the statutory requirements in order to be entitled to financial 
compensation under the factual innocence statute. Therefore, the fact that the case 
was dismissed, rather than going to retrial, does not excuse petitioner from having 
to meet all of the requirements of the factual innocence statute. 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
ANOTHER EVIDENTIARY HEARING DUPLICATING THE 23B 
HEARING WAS NOT NECESSARY 
In granting the State's motion to dismiss the factual innocence petition, the 
district court noted that it had already reviewed the evidence in the 23B remand and 
had "determined that there was 'no reasonable probability of a different outcome at 
trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified/" (R172, quoting R25-26). 
The petitioner claims that the district court should have held an evidentiary 
hearing in his factual innocence case, and that the court erred by relying on its 
previous findings following the 23B hearing (pet/s brief at 9-10,16-17). However, in 
support of his factual innocence petition, the petitioner relied on the evidence 
already presented during the 23B hearing. In the memorandum in support of his 
petition for factual innocence, the petitioner referred to the affidavit of Beverly 
Kolder, filed in support of his 23B motion (R51-52). Petitioner also attached to his 
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petition a copy of the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the 
23B evidentiary hearing (R13-26). In his opposition to the State's motion to dismiss, 
petitioner referred to additional evidence presented in the 23B action (R138,143-
146). 
Petitioner has failed to establish or even assert that he has any additional 
facts, testimony or evidence to present that was not already presented at the 23B 
hearing. Therefore, it was entirely appropriate for the district court to consider the 
evidence and findings from the 23B hearing. And there was no reason to hold a 
duplicate hearing. Petitioner has no right to relitigate factual determinations 
already made. Cf Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 443 (Utah 1996) ("The minimum 
reach of issue preclusion beyond precise repetition of the first action is to prevent 
relitigation by mere introduction of cumulative evidence bearing on a simple 
historical fact that has once been decided/") (citation omitted); Oman v. Davis School 
Dist, 2008 UT 70, % 31,194 P.3d 956 (citing Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 
P.2d 873,875 (Utah 1983) (" [I]ssue preclusion 'prevents the relitigation of issues that 
have been once litigated and determined in another action even though the claims for 
relief in the two actions may be different/') 
The facts upon which petitioner bases his factual innocence petition were 
already fully litigated in the 23B evidentiary hearing. Petitioner had his day in court 
in the 23B hearing, where he was given all of the process to which he was due, and 
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the factual issues were completely, fully, and fairly litigated. Cf. 3D Constr. and 
Development, LLC. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307,120,117R3d 1082 
(citing Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (Utah App 1987). 
Petitioner alleges that he was entitled to de novo review, and not "improper 
deference to a previously discredited ruling/7 (pet/s brief at 22). However, it was 
not improper for the court to look to its previous 23B ruling, and the court's 23B 
ruling has not been discredited. 
Petitioner claims that the "parties have stipulated" that the court's previous 
ruling following the 23B hearing "stopped short of doing justice." (pet/s brief at 22). 
That is incorrect. The parties made no such stipulation. The language in the 
stipulation submitted on appeal simply states that "in the interests of justice, and to 
expedite the disposition of this case, the parties file this Stipulated Motion for 
Summary Reversal." (addendum E, R27). It further states that "[w]hile preparing 
for oral argument, the parties came to an agreement about the disposition of the 
appeal. Specifically, they agreed that there was an error in the trial proceedings and 
that the interests of justice dictate that the defendant receive a new trial." 
(addendum E, R28). Petitioner already received all of the benefit he was entitled to 
from that agreement and stipulation. Petitioner's case was remanded for a new 
trial, and the district attorney chose not to proceed to trial. Petitioner was therefore 
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released from custody. As argued above, those facts do not establish that petitioner 
is innocent. 
Petitioner argues that the 23B ruling was "harsh and illogical/7 (pet/s brief at 
24). He also argues that the district court erred when it determined that there was 
"no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial if [the new witnesses] had 
testified." (pet/s brief at 27, quoting (R172)). Petitioner attacks the 23B court's 
findings and argues that the evidence presented at the 23B hearing "clearly did 
justify a reversal." (pet/s brief at 24-25). The State disagrees. A lower court's 
findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 19,100 P.3d 1177. Petitioner did not establish on appeal, and 
has not established in this proceeding, that the 23B findings were clearly erroneous. 
The district court heard all of the evidence and made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law following the 23B hearing. The district court found that 
"[ejvidence from the home health care nurse concerning the dates of her visits to 
defendant would have narrowed the window of time that defendant could have 
been gone from Louisiana, but would not have provided an alibi for the date of the 
crime on December 8,2000." (R24). The district court also made findings about the 
credibility of Berthella Miller. It found that "[b]ecause of her inconsistent 
statements and lack of memory about crucial information, testimony from Berthella 
Miller at the evidentiary hearing was not credible." (R24). 
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The district court concluded that, "in light of the other facts and evidence 
establishing defendant's guilt, including the credibility of the two eye witnesses 
who testified at trial, there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial 
even if Beverly Kolder and/or a representative of River West Home Health Care 
and Berthella Miller had testified/7 (R25-26). 
Petitioner has not presented any legally appropriate basis for holding a 
second hearing to present exactly the same evidence. " [0]nce a party has had his or 
her day in court and lost, he or she does not get a second chance to prevail on the 
same issues/7 State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 8 at Tf 2. 
The district court correctly determined that another evidentiary hearing was 
not necessary, and petitioner has failed to establish that the court's decision was 
incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted May 7, 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
ERIN RILEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
HARRY MILLER, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
RULING A « ^ ( C T C 0 M T 
Case No 
Judge Si 
Date: September 26, 2008 
°®PWC!W{ 
This matter is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Having considered the 
memoranda, the Court finds that the Motion should be GRANTED. 
Petitioner seeks a determination that he was actually innocent of the charges against him, which were 
ultimately dismissed. Actual innocence hearings are governed by Utah Code Annotated §78B-9-402 which 
provides: 
(2) (a) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district court 
in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is 
factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the person was convicted, if the person 
asserts factual innocence under oath and the petition alleges: 
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes that the petitioner is 
factually innocent; 
(ii) the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims establishes 
innocence; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates 
that the petitioner is factually innocent; and 
(vi) (A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the 
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence could not 
have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the 
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exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise 
reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence; or 
(C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) or 
(2)(a)(vi)(B) in the interest of justice. 
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that the following new evidence exists which establishes that he is factually 
innocent. (1) the Affidavit of Beverly Kolder, a registered nurse who provided Petitioner home health care 
in Louisiana on December 7, 2000 and December 14, 2000 and (2) the Affidavit of Berthella Miller. The 
Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required showing for a hearing. 
First, it is apparent from the record that Petitioner cannot meet either subsection (vi)(A) or (vi)(B). 
Specifically, Petitioner was aware of the substance of this evidence at the time of trial and it was all 
presented to his appellate counsel for purposes of making ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal. 
Additionally, the Court found that trial counsel was not ineffective. Although the Court could waive either 
or both of these requirements in the interest of justice, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met other 
prongs of Section 78B-9-402. 
Petitioner has not shown that the evidence, upon which he seeks to rely, is not cumulative of 
evidence presented at trial. Petitioner presented his alibi defense at trial. These additional witness would 
have served only to bolster his testimony, not to present a wholly new assertion. 
Finally, Petitioner cannot show that this evidence would "establish" that he was innocent. Although 
the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed the crime, the Court reviewed this evidence as part 
of a remand from the court of appeals and determined that there was "no reasonable probability of a different 
outcome at trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified." 
For the foregoing reasons, the State's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This Ruling and Order shall 
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serve as the final order on this matter. No further order need be prepared by th 
DATED this^ day of September, 2008. 
< j 
Judge Sheila K. McCi 






U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-401 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*§j Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
*g Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence 
«+§ 78B-9-401. Title 
This part is known as "Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence." 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 358, § 5, eff. May 5, 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 123, § 10, provides: 
"Section 10. Coordinating S.B. 278 with S.B. 16—Technical renumbering. 
"If this S.B. 278 and S.B. 16, Exoneration and Innocence Assistance, both pass, it 
is the intent of the Legislature that the following sections in S.B. 16 be re-
numbered as follows: 
"(1) Section 78-35a-300.5 be renumbered to 78B-9-300; 
"(2) Section 78-35a-401 be renumbered to 78B-9-401 
"(3) Section 78-35a-402 be renumbered to 78B-9-402 
"(4) Section 78-35a-403 be renumbered to 78B-9-403 
"(5) Section 78-35a-404 be renumbered to 78B-9-404; and 
"(6) Section 78-35a-405 be renumbered to 78B-9-405." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-401, UT ST § 78B-9-401 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 
2008 General Election. 
Copr © 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works. 
END OF DOCUMENT 




U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-402 
This document has been updated. Use KEYCITE. 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*gl Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
*l§ Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence 
„+§ 78B-9-402. Petition for determination of factual innocence—Sufficient 
allegations—Notification of victim 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Factually innocent" means a person did not: 
(a) engage in the conduct for which the person was convicted; 
(b) engage in conduct relating to any lesser included offenses; or 
(c) commit any other felony arising out of or reasonably connected to the facts 
supporting the indictment or information upon which the person was convicted. 
(2) (a) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the dis-
trict court in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to es-
tablish that the person is factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the 
person was convicted, if the person asserts factual innocence under oath and the 
petition alleges: 
(i) newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes that the peti-
tioner is factually innocent; 
(ii) the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner claims es-
tablishes innocence; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
(v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demon-
strates that the petitioner is factually innocent; and 
(vi)(A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at 
the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any pre-
viously filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence 
could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel 
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through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exer-
cise reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence; or 
(C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) or 
(2)(a)(vi)(B) in the interest of justice. 
(b) A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or re-
versed the person's conviction may also file a petition under this part if no 
retrial or appeal regarding this offense is pending. 
(3) If some or all of the evidence alleged to be exonerating is biological evid-
ence subject to DNA testing, the petitioner shall seek DNA testing pursuant to 
Section 78B-9-301. 
(4) The petition shall be in compliance with Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, and shall include the underlying criminal case number. 
(5) After a petition is filed under this section, prosecutors, law enforcement of-
ficers, and crime laboratory personnel shall cooperate in preserving evidence and 
in determining the sufficiency of the chain of custody of the evidence which is 
the subject of the petition. 
(6)(a) A person who files a petition under this section shall serve notice of the 
petition and a copy of the petition upon the office of the prosecutor who obtained 
the conviction and upon the Utah attorney general. The attorney general shall, 
within 30 days after receipt of service of the notice, or within any additional 
period of time the court allows, answer or otherwise respond to all proceedings 
initiated under this part. 
(b) (i) After the time for response by the attorney general under Subsection 
(6) (a) has passed, the court shall order a hearing if it finds there is a bona 
fide issue as to whether the petitioner is factually innocent of the charges of 
which the petitioner was convicted. 
(ii) If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner 
is factually innocent, the court may find the petitioner is factually innocent 
without holding a hearing. 
(7) The court may not grant a petition for a hearing under this part during the 
period in which criminal proceedings in the matter are pending before any trial or 
appellate court, unless stipulated to by the parties. 
(8) Any victim of a crime that is the subject of a petition under this part, and 
who has elected to receive notice under Section 77-38-3, shall be notified by the 
state's attorney of any hearing regarding the petition. 
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CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 358, § 6, eff. May 5, 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 123, § 10, provides: 
"Section 10. Coordinating S.B. 278 with S.B. 16—Technical renumbering. 
"If this S.B. 278 and S.B. 16, Exoneration and Innocence Assistance, both pass, it 
is the intent of the Legislature that the following sections in S.B. 16 be re-
numbered as follows: 
"(1) Section 78-35a-300.5 be renumbered to 78B-9-300; 
"(2) Section 78-35a-401 be renumbered to 78B-9-401 
"(3) Section 78-35a-402 be renumbered to 78B-9-402 
"(4) Section 78-35a-403 be renumbered to 78B-9-403 
"(5) Section 78-35a-404 be renumbered to 78B-9-404; and 
"(6) Section 78-35a-405 be renumbered to 78B-9-405." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-402, UT ST § 78B-9-402 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 
2008 General Election. 
Copr © 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-403 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
*{§! Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
*jU Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence 
„+§ 78B-9-403. Requests for appointment of counsel—Appeals—Postconviction 
petitions 
(1) Subsections 78B-9-109(l) and (2), regarding the appointment of pro bono coun-
sel, apply to any request for the appointment of counsel under this part. 
(2) Subsection 78B-9-109(3), regarding effectiveness of counsel, applies to sub-
sequent postconviction petitions and to appeals under this part. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 358, § 7, eff. May 5, 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 123, § 10, provides: 
"Section 10. Coordinating S.B. 278 with S.B. 16—Technical renumbering. 
,TIf this S.B. 278 and S.B. 16, Exoneration and Innocence Assistance, both pass, it 
is the intent of the Legislature that the following sections in S.B. 16 be re-
numbered as follows: 
"(1) Section 78-35a-300.5 be renumbered to 78B-9-300; 
"(2) Section 78-35a-401 be renumbered to 78B-9-401 
"(3) Section 78-35a-402 be renumbered to 78B-9-402 
"(4) Section 78-35a-403 be renumbered to 78B-9-403 
"(5) Section 78-35a-404 be renumbered to 78B-9-404; and 
"(6) Section 78-35a-405 be renumbered to 78B-9-405." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-403, UT ST § 78B-9-403 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 
2008 General Election. 
Copr © 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works. 
END OF DOCUMENT 




West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Kg Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
*§ Part 4. Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence 
«•§ 78B-9-404. Hearing upon petition—Procedures—Court determination o£ 
factual innocence 
(1)(a) In any hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall 
represent the state. 
(b) The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual in-
nocence by clear and convincing evidence. 
(2) The court may consider: 
(a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and 
(b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay in evaluat-
ing its weight and credibility. 
(3) In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to the evid-
ence presented at the hearing under this part, all the evidence presented at the 
original trial and at any postconviction proceedings in the case. 
(4) If the court, after considering all the evidence, determines by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the petitioner: 
(a) is factually innocent of one or more offenses of which the petitioner was 
convicted, the court shall order that those convictions: 
(i) be vacated with prejudice; and 
(ii) be expunged from the petitioner's record/ or 
(b) did not commit one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, 
but the court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner 
did not commit any lesser included offenses relating to those offenses, the 
court shall modify the original conviction and sentence of the petitioner as ap-
propriate for the lesser included offense, whether or not the lesser included 
offense was originally submitted to the trier of fact. 
(5) (a) If the court, after considering all the evidence, does not determine by 
clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent of the of-
fense or offenses the petitioner is challenging and does not find that Subsection 
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(4)(b) applies, the court shall deny the petition regarding the offense or of-
fenses . 
(b) If the court finds that the petition was brought in bad faith, it shall 
enter the finding on the record, and the petitioner may not file a second or 
successive petition under this section without first applying to and obtaining 
permission from the court which denied the prior petition. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 358, § 8, eff. May 5, 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 123, § 10, provides: 
"Section 10. Coordinating S.B. 278 with S.B. 16—Technical renumbering. 
"If this S.B. 278 and S.B. 16, Exoneration and Innocence Assistance, both pass, it 
is the intent of the Legislature that the following sections in S.B. 16 be re-
numbered as follows: 
"(1) Section 78-35a-300.5 be renumbered to 78B-9-300; 
"(2) Section 78-35a-401 be renumbered to 78B-9-401 
"(3) Section 78-35a-402 be renumbered to 78B-9-402 
"(4) Section 78-35a-403 be renumbered to 78B-9-403 
"(5) Section 78-35a-404 be renumbered to 78B-9-404; and 
"(6) Section 78-35a-405 be renumbered to 78B-9-405." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-404, UT ST § 78B-9-404 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 
2008 General Election. 
Copr © 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-405 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Kg Chapter 9. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos) 
*!| Part 4 . Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence 
«+§ 78B-9-405. Judgment and assistance payment 
(1)(a) If a court finds a petitioner factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 
9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or under this part, and if the petitioner 
has served a period of incarceration, the court shall order that, as provided in 
Subsection (2), the petitioner shall receive for each year or portion of a year 
the petitioner was incarcerated, up to a maximum of 15 years, the monetary equi-
valent of the average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah, as determined 
by the data most recently published by the Department of Workforce Services at the 
time of the petitioner's release from prison. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (1), "petitioner" means a United States citizen 
or an individual who was otherwise lawfully present in this country at the time 
of the incident that gave rise to the underlying conviction. 
(2) Payments pursuant to this section shall be made as follows: 
(a) The Office of Crime Victim Reparations shall pay from the Crime Victim Re-
parations Fund to the petitioner within 45 days of the court order under Subsec-
tion (1) an initial sum equal to either 20% of the total financial assistance 
payment as determined under Subsection (1) or an amount equal to two years of 
incarceration, whichever is greater, but not to exceed the total amount owed. 
(b) The Legislature shall appropriate as nonlapsing funds from the General Fund, 
and no later than the next general session following the issuance of the court 
order under Subsection (1): 
(i) to the Crime Victim Reparations Fund, the amount that was paid out of the 
fund under Subsection (2)(a); and 
(ii) to the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, as a separate line 
item, the amount ordered by the court for payments under Subsection (1), minus 
the amount reimbursed to the Crime Victim Reparations Fund under Subsection 
(2) (b) (i) . 
(c) Payments to the petitioner under this section, other than the payment under 
Subsection (2) (a), shall be made by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile 
Justice quarterly on or before the last day of the month next succeeding each 
calendar quarterly period. 
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(d) Payments under Subsection (2)(c) shall: 
(i) commence no later than one year after the effective date of the appropri-
ation for the payments; 
(ii) be made to the petitioner for the balance of the amount ordered by the 
court after the initial payment under Subsection (2)(a); and 
(iii) be allocated so that the entire amount due to the petitioner under this 
section has been paid no later than ten years after the effective date of the 
appropriation made under Subsection (2) (b) . 
(3)(a) Payments pursuant to this section shall be reduced to the extent that the 
period of incarceration for which the petitioner seeks payment was attributable to 
a separate and lawful conviction. 
(b) (i) Payments pursuant to this section shall be tolled upon the commencement 
of any period of incarceration due to the petitioner's subsequent conviction of 
a felony and shall resume upon the conclusion of that period of incarceration. 
(ii) As used in this section, "felony" means a criminal offense classified as a 
felony under Title 76, Chapter 3, Punishments, or conduct that would constitute 
a felony if committed in Utah. 
(c) The reduction of payments pursuant to Subsection (3)(a) or the tolling of 
payments pursuant to Subsection (3)(b) shall be determined by the same court 
that finds a petitioner to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, 
Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part. 
(4)(a) A person is ineligible for any payments under this part if the person was 
already serving a prison sentence in another jurisdiction at the time of the con-
viction of the crime for which that person has been found factually innocent pur-
suant to Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part, 
and that person is to be returned to that other jurisdiction upon release for fur-
ther incarceration on the prior conviction. 
(b) Ineligibility for any payments pursuant to this Subsection (4) shall be de-
termined by the same court that finds a person to be factually innocent under 
Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part. 
(5) Payments pursuant to this section: 
(a) are not subject to any Utah state taxes; and 
(b) may not be offset by any expenses incurred by the state or any political 
subdivision of the state, including expenses incurred to secure the petitioner's 
custody, or to feed, clothe, or provide medical services for the petitioner. 
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(6) If a court finds a petitioner to be factually innocent under Title 78B, 
Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part, the court shall also: 
(a) issue an order of expungement of the petitioner's criminal record for all 
acts in the charging document upon which the payment under this part is based; and 
(b) provide a letter to the petitioner explaining that the petitioner's convic-
tion has been vacated on the grounds of factual innocence and indicating that 
the petitioner did not commit the crime or crimes for which the petitioner was 
convicted and was later found to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 
9, Part 3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part. 
(7) A petitioner found to be factually innocent under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 
3, Postconviction DNA Testing, or this part shall have access to the same services 
and programs available to Utah citizens generally as though the conviction for 
which the petitioner was found to be factually innocent had never occurred. 
(8) Payments pursuant to this part constitute a full and conclusive resolution of 
the petitioner's claims on the specific issue of factual innocence. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 2008, c. 358, § 9, eff. May 5, 2008. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2008, c. 123, § 10, provides: 
"Section 10. Coordinating S.B. 278 with S.B. 16—Technical renumbering. 
"If this S.B. 278 and S.B. 16, Exoneration and Innocence Assistance, both pass, it 
is the intent of the Legislature that the following sections in S.B. 16 be re-





















































U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-405, UT ST § 78B-9-405 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-405 
Page 4 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 
2008 General Election. 
Copr © 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
* i Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Armos) 
* ! Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings 
-•RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code 
Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the 
district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on 
forms provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in 
the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties 
or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legal-
ity of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not 
be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state: 
(c)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in 
which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the 
petitioner; 
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief; 
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been 
reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and 
the results of the appeal; 
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or 
other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, 
and the results of the prior proceeding; and 
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evid-
ence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previ-
ous post-conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition: 
(d)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the peti-
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doner's case; 
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and 
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities 
in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the 
petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sen-
tenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case 
in the normal course. 
(g)(1) Summaiy dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the 
court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous 
on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been 
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceed-
ings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and at-
tachments, it appears that: 
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(g)(2)(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(g)(2)(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition. 
(g)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with 
the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. 
The court may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
(g)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the 
petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should 
not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and dir-
ect the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the 
petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the 
Attorney General. In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after 
service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, 
the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and 
shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus 
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time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner 
may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless 
ordered by the court. 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise 
dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as 
to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may: 
(j)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(j)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(j)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary 
hearing. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the 
petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or 
video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not 
otherwise be present in court during the proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facil-
ity where the petitioner is confined. 
(1) Discovery; records. Disco very under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a 
party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with 
evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the 
respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records. 
(m) Orders; stay. 
(m)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be 
stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner 
that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter 
the stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(m)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire 
and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(m)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter 
any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may 
be necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it 
deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental en-
tity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Utah Code 
Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the 
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the 
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Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996; amended effective November 1, 2008.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs proceedings challenging a conviction or sen-
tence, regardless whether the claim relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, 
or a sentence other than commitment. Claims relating to the terms or conditions of confinement are governed by 
paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B. This rule, as a general matter, simplifies the pleading requirements and contains 
two significant changes from procedure under the former rule. First, the paragraph requires the clerk of court to 
assign post-conviction relief to the judge who sentenced the petitioner if that judge is available. Second, the rule 
allows the court to dismiss frivolous claims before any answer or other response is required. This provision is 
patterned after the federal practice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory committee adopted the summary 
procedures set forth as a means of balancing the requirements of fairness and due process on the one hand 
against the public's interest in the efficient adjudication of the enormous volume of post-conviction relief cases. 
The requirement in paragraph (1) for a determination that discovery is necessary to discover relevant evidence 
that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing is a higher standard than is normally used determining 
motions for discovery. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Petition for determination of factual innocence, see § 78B-9-402. 
Petition for relief under Post-Conviction Remedies Act, see Rules Civ. Proc, Form 47. 
Postconviction Remedies Act, replacement of prior remedies, see § 78B-9-102. 
Postconviction testing of DNA, see § 78B-9-301. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Criminal Law €==>1570 to 1600, 1610 to 1616, 1650 to 1669. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110kl570to 110kl600; 110kl610to 110kl616; 110kl650to 110kl669. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Application, 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), application for federal 
habeas corpus review is not an application for state postconviction or other 
collateral review, see Duncan v. Walker, U.S.N.Y.2001, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 533 
U.S. 167. 
Habeas corpus, pending application for state collateral review, tolling of 
federal time limits, time between lower state court's decision and filing of 
notice of appeal to higher state court, see Carey v. Saffold, U.S.Cal.2002, 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and 
ORDER 
Case No. 03190^63 
JUDGE SHEILA K. McCLEVE 
Pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Court of 
Appeals reinanded this case for an evidentiary hearing on the following claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel: 
1. Trial counsel's failure to present the testimony of Berthella Miller, 
Beverly Kolder, and/or a designated representative of River West 
Home Health Care relating to Appellant Harry Miller's alibi defense; 
2. Trial counsel's failure to file a written notice of his intention to claim 
an alibi defense and provide the names and addresses of alibi 
witnesses pursuant to Utah Code section 77-14-2; and 
3. If trial counsel's performance is found to be deficient, the prejudicial 
effect, if any, of the deficient performance on the outcome of the trial. 
In compliance with that order, an evidentiary hearing was conducted on 
September 26, 2005. Due to the unavailability of a witness, the hearing was 
continued and concluded on October 14,2005. At the hearing, defendant Miller was 
represented by his counsel, Mr. Patrick Lindsay. The State was represented by 
assistant attorneys general Matthew Bates and Erin Riley. 
At the hearing, defendant Miller waived his attorney/client privilege as to his 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (R. Vol. I, p. 6). The Court then heard 
testimony from defendant, defendant's trial counsel Mr. John O'Connell Jr., original 
appellate counsel Mr. Kent Hart, and defendant's niece, Ms. Berthella Miller. In 
addition, exhibits were admitted, including the affidavits of Beverly Kolder and 
Melissa Landry, and the parties entered a stipulation as to the admissibility of the 
medical records (R. Vol. I., p. 16, 22-24). 
The Court notes that pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 2313(e), 
the burden of proving a fact is upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of 
proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted written memoranda 
summarizing their views of the facts and the law concerning the issues. Based on 
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the testimony, evidence, and memoranda, the Court now enters the following 
factual findings: 
BEVERLY KOLDER AND/OR A REPRESENTATIVE OF RIVER 
WEST HOME HEALTH CARE 
1. It was apparent from the hospital records that trial defense counsel John 
O'Connell obtained prior to trial, that defendant received home health care 
following his hospital stay (R. Vol. I, p. 36). 
2. The name of the home health care agency was not included in the hospital 
records (R. Vol. I, p. 36). 
3. Defense counsel knew that a home health care nurse had visited defendant, 
but he did not know the name of the home health care nurse (R. Vol. I, p. 36). 
4. Defendant could not remember the name of the hospital where he was treated 
(R. Vol. I, p. 30). 
5. Defendant did not know or could not remember the name of the home health 
care agency (R. Vol. I, p. 30; Vol. II, p. 6-7). 
6. Defendant did not know or could not remember the name of any of the 
nurses or therapists who visited him (R. Vol. I, p. 30-31; Vol. II, p. 6). 
7. Defendant's sister, Paula Miller, also did not know or did not tell defense 
counsel the name of the home health care agency (R, Vol. I, p. 36). 
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8. Paula provided defense counsel with the name of the hospital where 
defendant was treated (R. Vol. I, p. 31). 
9. Defense counsel's investigator contacted the hospital, provided them with a 
waiver from defendant, and the hospital sent defendant's hospital records to 
defense counsel prior to trial (R. Vol. I, p. 31). 
10. Initial appellate counsel, Mr. Hart, did not remember seeing in the hospital 
records any reference to the exact home health care agency that provided 
treatment for defendant. He also did not remember seeing the name of the 
nurse who participated in that treatment (R. Vol. I, p. 19). 
11. Before conflicting out of the case, Mr. Hart was not able to ascertain anything 
further about the location of the home health care records or possible records 
relating to it (R. Vol. I, p. 13). 
12. Home health care nurse Beverly Kolder visited defendant on the 7th and 14th 
of December, 2000. Her visit on the 7th of December concluded at 11:02 a.m. 
(R. Vol I., p. 23-24, exhibits 2 & 3). 
13. A speech therapist attempted to visit defendant on 4th, 6th, and 11th of 
December 2000, but defendant was not at home (R. Vol. I, p. 24, exhibits 2 & 
3). 
4 
The crime for which defendant was convicted occurred in Salt Lake City on 
December 8, 2000 (R. Vol. I, p. 23). 
Defendant could have traveled by airplane from Louisiana to Utah on 
December 7, 2005, in time to rob Julia Smart on December 8, 2005. 
BERTHELLA MILLER 
Defendant had a sister in Louisiana named Paula, who he lived with 
following his stroke (R. Vol. I, p. 30,38, Vol. II, p. 7-8). 
Defendant could provide his trial defense counsel, John O'Connell, Jr., with 
only a partial address for his sister Paula (R. Vol. I, p. 28). 
Defense counsel sent a letter to Paula at the partial address (R. Vol. I, p. 28). 
Paula apparently received the letter because she then contacted defense 
counsel (R. Vol. I, p. 29) 
Defense counsel spoke with Paula and asked her to come to Utah to testify at 
trial (R. Vol. I, p. 29). 
Originally, Paula was cooperative and was willing to come and testify (R. Vol. 
I, p. 29, 30). 
5 
22. Paula helped counsel locate defendant's employer and the hospital (R. Vol. I, 
p. 29). Paula provided defense counsel with the name of the hospital where 
defendant was treated (R. Vol. I, p . 31). 
23. Defense counsel's investigator then contacted the hospital, provided them 
with a waiver from defendant, and they sent the hospital records to defense 
counsel (R. Vol. I, p. 31). 
24. The hospital records showed Paula Shepherd' as the contact person for 
defendant and listed a phone number, which was actually a neighbor's phone 
number (R. Vol. I, p. 32, 46-47). 
25. At some point close to trial, Paula became very emphatic that she was not 
going to come out to Utah to testify (R. Vol. I, p. 30). 
26. Defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing that he knew his sister Paula 
had refused to come testify at his trial (R. Vol. II, p. 8). 
27. Defense counsel testified that he did not subpoena Paula because she was in 
another state, and he believed defendant's alibi was pretty strong based on 
the fact that he had had a stroke and had been in the hospital in Louisiana (R. 
Vol. I, p. 44-45, 47). In addition, he did not want to bring out a witness who 
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did not want to come, when he wanted that witness to say nice things about 
his client. He was afraid she might make it worse (R. Vol. I, p. 45, 47-48). 
28. Defendant's niece, Berthella Miller, was living with Paula and defendant 
following defendant's stroke (R. Vol. II, p. 13-14). 
29. Defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing that he told his defense counsel 
about his niece Berthella (R. Vol. II, p. 5). 
30. Defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that defendant did not tell 
him about his niece, Berthella (R. Vol. I, p. 30). 
31. The Court finds defense counsel's testimony credible. 
32. At the time of trial, defendant did not know Berthella's address or telephone 
number and did not know where Berthella was living (R. Vol. II, p. 9). 
33. Berthella was listed in the hospital medical records as being one of the people 
who picked defendant up from the hospital upon his release. However, it 
only listed her first name and no telephone number (R. Vol. I, p. 43). In 
addition, there was nothing in the record to indicate that she would be caring 
for defendant upon his release (R. Vol. I, p. 17, 43). 
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34. When defense counsel asked Paula "Can you tell me of anybody else or 
anyone who could, instead of bringing you out, can you provide me with 
somebody else who could do it?" Paula told him no (R. Vol. I, p. 30). 
35. Defense counsel also testified that defendant did not remember the names of 
anyone else who would have been able to corroborate his alibi in Louisiana, 
besides his sister Paula (R. Vol. I, p. 31) 
36. Mr. Hart obtained Berthella's telephone number from Mr. Miller's employer, 
Ms. Snyder (R. Vol. I, p. 11). 
37. After four months of trying and three continuances, defendant's appellate 
counsel was able to bring Berthella to Utah to testify at a rule 23B hearing on 
October 14, 2005. 
38. Berthella could not remember how long defendant lived there (R. Vol. II, p. 
14). 
39. Berthella could not remember when defendant came to live at Paula's, except 
that it was after he had been in the hospital (R. Vol. II, p. 15). 
40. Berthella testified that she saw defendant every day and night during that 
time period (R. Vol. II, p. 15, 20). 
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41. However, Berthella also acknowledged that she had previously told counsel 
for the state that at the time defendant had his stroke, she was not living with 
Paula, that she lived a couple of minutes away. Berthella testified that "[a]t 
that time I had moved out. And I said I had moved out but I were [sic] living 
with her/ ' (R. Vol. II, p. 23). 
42. When asked again if she had previously said that she was not living with 
Paula when defendant was recovering from his stroke, Berthella said: "I think 
so. I don't know. I been having so many questions asked. But I was living 
there at the time, then I moved out." (R. Vol. II, p. 23). 
43. Berthella admitted that she sometimes worked a double shift and that she 
sometimes worked weekends (R. Vol. II, p. 27). It was possible that during 
the period when defendant was recovering from his stroke, she might have 
been at work from four in the morning until eleven at night. Therefore, there 
might have been a day where she did not see him because she was at work (R. 
Vol. II, p. 28). 
44. Berthella did not remember the date or the day of the week that defendant 
had his stroke, or the date that she picked him up from the hospital (R. Vol. II, 
p. 24) 
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45. Berthella could not remember how long defendant lived with Paula following 
his stroke (R. Vol. II, p. 26). 
46. Berthella could not remember when defendant went back to work, except that 
he had his stroke, was at home for a little while and then went back to work 
(R. Vol. II, p. 16) 
47. At the time, Berthella and defendant worked at the same place (R. Vol. II, p. 
16). 
48. Berthella was never at home when the home health care nurse came to visit 
defendant (R. Vol. II, p. 18-19). 
49. Berthella knew that an attorney had called and asked Paula to come and 
testify at the trial, but that Paula would not come (R. Vol. II, p. 30). 
50. Berthella testified that defendant was her uncle, that she liked being with 
him, that it made her a little sad that he was in jail, and that she would like to 
see him get out (R. Vol. II, p. 31). 
51. Berthella testified that when defendant left the house she remembered him 
saying that he was coming back to Salt Lake —but she did not remember 
when that was (R. Vol. II, p. 34). 
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Defend ant never asked his defense counsel if he had asked Berthella to come 
and testify at trial (R. Vol. II, p. 8) 
Berthella made inconsistent statements and had a poor memory of 
defendant's stroke. The Court therefore finds that her testimony was, at best, 
not reliable and that she would not have been a credible witness at 
defendant's trial. 
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO CLAIM ALIBI DEFENSE 
Trial defense counsel did not provide written notice of intention to claim an 
alibi defense and did not provide the names and addresses of alibi witnesses 
(R. Vol I,' p. 48-49). 
At trial, no alibi witnesses testified other than defendant (R. Vol. I, p . 37). 
At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that he did not file 
written notice of alibi because he knew he was not going to call any alibi 
witnesses other than defendant (R. Vol. I, p. 37). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. • 77-14-2(3) (West 2004), "the defendant may 
always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi/' 
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PREJUDICE 
Evidence from the home health care nurse concerning the dates of her visits 
to defendant would have narrowed the window of time that defendant could 
have been gone from Louisiana, but would not have provided an alibi for the 
date of the crime on December 8, 2000. 
Evidence from the home health care nurse fails to establish a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome at trial. 
Because of her inconsistent statements and lack of memory about crucial 
information, testimony from Berthella Miller at the evidentiary hearing was 
not credible. If her testimony had been presented at trial, it would have been 
weighed against all of the other facts, testimony, and evidence presented at 
trial, including the credible testimony of the victim and the second eye-
witness. 
Testimony from Berthella Miller fails to establish a reasonable probability of a 
different outcome at trial. 
RULE 23B(e) FINDINGS ON CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Based on the evidence and the above findings of fact, the Court finds that 
defense counsel was not deficient in failing to present the testimony of 
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Beverly Kolder and/or a designated representative of River West Home 
Health Care, because defendant failed to provide him with information to 
locate this witness, and because evidence from this witness does not establish 
an alibi for the date of the crime. 
63. Based on the evidence and the above findings of fact, the Court finds that 
defense counsel was not deficient in failing to present the testimony of 
Berthella Miller because counsel was unaware that Berthella had any relevant 
information, defendant failed to tell him that Berthella might have been a 
helpful witness, and defendant failed to provide him with information to 
locate this witness. 
64. Based on the evidence and the above findings of fact, the Court finds that 
defense counsel was not deficient in failing to file a written notice of intention 
to claim an alibi defense because he presented no alibi witnesses at trial other 
than defendant. 
65. Based on the evidence and the above findings of fact, the Court finds that 
even if the alleged deficiencies are assumed arguendo, defendant was not 
prejudiced. The Court finds that in light of the other facts and evidence 
establishing defendant's guilt, including the credibility of the two eye 
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witnesses who testified at trial, there is no reasonable probability of a 
different outcome at trial even if Beverly Kolder and/or a representative of 
River West Home Health Care and Berthella Miller had testified. 
Based on the evidence and the above findings of fact, the Court finds that 
even if trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a written notice of 
intention to claim an alibi defense, defendant was not prejudiced. 
DATED this _[_ day of r&0fa/i*&f 2006. 
,-i^ ^A roved as to form: //^ ^ ~ r / 
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STIPULATED MOTION FOR 
! SUMMARY REVERSAL 
Case No. 20040150-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in the interests of 
justice, and to expedite the disposition of this case, the parties file this Stipulated 
Motion for Summary Reversal.1 
On December 16, 2003, a jury convicted defendant of aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony. The court sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of five years to 
1
 Under rule 10, motions for summary disposition that are not based on jurisdiction 
must be filed within 10-days of filing the docketing statement. But this Court may 
suspend the time limit in rule 10 "[i]n the interest of expediting a decision/' Utah R. 
App. P. 2. 
life on February 9, 2004. Defendant timely appealed, and he has remained incarcerated 
during the appeal. 
On appeal, defendant has asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
obtaining additional evidence to support his alibi. He presented evidence to that effect 
in the district court during a temporary remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The parties have now completed briefing, and this Court set the 
case for oral argument on Monday, January 22, 2006. 
While preparing for oral argument, the parties came to an agreement about the 
disposition of the appeal. Specifically, they agreed that there was an error in the trial 
proceedings and that the interests of justice dictate that defendant receive a new trial. 
WHEREFORE, to expedite the resolution of this case, the parties move this Court 
for an order canceling oral argument, reversing defendant's conviction for aggravated 
robbery, and remanding the case to the district court for a new trial. 
DATED this /% day of January 2007, 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
PATRICK V.LI&DSAY / MATTHEW D. BATES 
Counsel for Appellant ( Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this j 5 _ day of January 2007, the foregoing STIPULATED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL was hand-delivered to defendant's counsel of 
record as follows: 
Patrick V. Linsday 
290 West Center St. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
/^t^^. 
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JAN I 2 2007 
State of Utah, 
P la in t i f f and Appellee, 
v. 
Harry Miller, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 20040150-CA 
Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Thorne. 
This matter is before the court upon the Parties' stipulated 
motion for summary reversal, filed January 18, 2007. The parties 
agreed that there was an error in the trial proceedings and that 
the interests of justice dictate that defendant receive a new 
trial. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that oral argument scheduled 
for January 22, 2007, at 9:30 a.m. is canceled. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED the this case is remanded to 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department for a new trial. 
Dated this Zo46\day of January, 2007. 
FOR THE COURT: 
4 M 
Carolyf j /B. McHugh, Ju 
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Addendum F 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENT MORGAN, 3945 
Deputy District Attorney 
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MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 031901163 FS 
Hon. Sheila K. McCleve 
KENT MORGAN, attorney for plaintiff, moves this court for an order dismissing the 
above-entitled matter in the interests of justice. 
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2007. 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney 
ORIGINAL 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENT MORGAN, 3945 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
3003811 
By-
« " » W W C T COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL D 6 2007 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Oep! 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 





ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 031901163 FS 
Hon. Sheila K. McCleve 
Based upon the motion of the Plaintiff and in the interests of justice, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the information in the above-entitled matter be 
dismissed. 
DATED this day of July, 2007. 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS ISl 
AN ORIGINAL OOCUMEN' 
THIRD DISTRICT C0U 
COUNTY, STf lW/MW»H 
DATEt _ l 
W 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS and 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL was delivered to Gretchen Havner, Attorney for Defendant Harry 
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RULE 23B MOTION 
FOR REMAND 
Case No. 20040150-CA 
Comes now, Harry Miller, by and through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 23B of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby requests that this Court remand this case to 
the Fourth District for a hearing in order that there might be an adequate record on appeal 
regarding Nelson's claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Nelson includes with this 
motion a memorandum of points and authorities, supporting affidavits, and a proposed 
order for remand. 
DATED this £_ day of August, 2004. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
PATRICK V. LINDSAY (8309) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 






MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
' AND AUTHORITIES IN 
IN SUPPORT OF 23B MOTION 
Case No. 20040150-CA 
Comes now, appellant, by and through counsel, and pursuant to Rules 23 and 23B 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby submits a Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support of appellant's motion to remand for a hearing on appellant's claims 
of ineffectiveness by trial counsel. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The information filed in this matter lists the offense date as December 8, 2000 (R. 
3-4). In December of 2003, Miller was convicted by a jury in Third District Court of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony (R. 83). In February of 2004, Miller was 
sentenced to five years to life at the Utah State Prison (R. 136-13 8).. 
The basis for the conviction was an allegation by Julia Smart that she was accosted 
at knife point by a man who took her purse, and attempted to take her car at a 
convenience store (R. 158 at 52-55). Ron Nissen, the clerk at the convenience store, did 
not see the robbery, but after Smart told him she'd been robbed, he called the police and 
went out and watched the man try to unsuccessfully drive off in Smart's car and then 
watched as the man ran off (R. 158 at 91-95). Two years and a couple months later, 
through a photo and live line-up, Smart identified Miller as the man who had robbed her 
(R. 158 at 63-67, 81-83). Almost three years after the robbery in question, Nissen, 
through a photo line-up, identified Miller as the robber (R. 158 at 94-96). Both Smart and 
Nissen also identified Miller in court during the trial as the perpetrator of the robbery (R. 
158 at 64, 67, 95-96). 
Trial counsel presented an alibi defense to the jury. Miller, the only witness called 
by trial counsel, testified that he was living in Donaldsville, Louisiana at the time of the 
crime, and had been since 1999 (R. 158 at 103). Miller testified that from 1989-1999 he 
had lived in Salt Lake City (R. 158 at 103). Miller also testified that he worked for 10M 
Vending Machine from 2000 to February 2002 when he returned to Salt Lake City by bus 
which was a three day trip (R. 158 at 103-05). 
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Miller testified that on the day after Thanksgiving he had a stroke and was 
hospitalized for four days and had to take some time off work (R. 158 at 105-06, 108). 
He further testified that a nurse would come by after and help him with his speech that 
was affected by the stroke (R. 158 at 108). 
The State and defense counsel also agreed upon a stipulation which was read into 
the record that Miller was employed by the 10M Corporation in Donaldsville, Louisiana 
from the end of May 2000 until February 2002 and that Miller was on medical leave from 
November 25*, 2000 until December 13th, 2000 (R. 158 at 110). The stipulation also 
stated that on November 25th of 2000 Miller was admitted into the River West Medical 
Center for a cerebrovascular accident with Broca's aphasia, commonly known as a stroke, 
and released from there November 28th, 2000 (R. 158 at 110). 
At trial, Miller was represented by John O'Connell Jr. 
ARGUMENT 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants the right to be represented by competent legal counsel. In order to establish 
ineffective counsel, "it is the Defendant's burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial 
would probably have been different but for counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt 781 P.2d 473, 477 
(UtahApp. 1989). 
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When claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal it is the 
appellant's obligation "to provide an adequate record on appeal" and without such a 
record the appellate court "must assume the regularity of the proceedings below." State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at 1J1 1, 12 P.3d 92 (citations omitted). However, the Utah 
Supreme Court also recognized in Litherland that "counsel's ineffectiveness may have 
caused , exacerbated, or contributed to the record deficiencies." 2000 UT 76 at ^ [12. 
Accordingly, Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Procedure is "specifically designed to 
address the inadequate record dilemma" by allowing appellant to move for a temporaiy 
remand for supplementation of the record when aware of nonspeculative facts not "fully 
appearing on the record... which if true could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective." Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at %U, 16 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B). See also, 
State v. Johnston, 2000 UT App 290 at j^ 7, 13 P.3d 178. In other words, "where some 
crucial factual information is absent from the record," a Rule 23B remand is appropriate. 
Johnston, 2000 UT App at ^ 9 (quoting State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 n.5 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
Miller asserts that he is faced with an inadequate record dilemma dike that 
contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court in Litherland. Miller asserts that his trial 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in the following areas which prejudiced him at 
trial and that the appellate record is currently inadequate to establish this ineffectiveness 
and the resulting prejudice: 
One, trial counsel failed to procure and present to the jury essential alibi witnesses 
who would have verified Miller's testimony of his presence in Donaldsville, Louisiana, at 
the time of the offense in Utah although he knew from Miller, and/or with due diligence 
in investigating, should have known said witnesses were available and essential. For 
example, Miller's niece, Berthella Miller, would have testified that she wras living with 
Miller and her Aunt, Miller's sister, in her aunt's home during the time period in question, 
that she saw Miller daily while he was recuperating from the stroke, and that he did not 
leave the state nor does she believe he was capable of leaving the state during the time 
period in question.1 
Two, trial counsel failed to procure and/or introduce documents/records into 
evidence at trial that would have similarly greatly bolstered and been essential to Miller's 
defense. 
For example, although trial counsel had in his file, and Miller communicated to 
trial counsel the existence of court records showing Miller's presence in court in 
Louisiana on December 5th, 2000, trial counsel did not attempt to introduce said records at 
1
 Paula Miller, Miller's sister, was another possible essential witness whose testimony 
would have been similar to Berthella Miller's. Trial counsel stated during sentencing that he had 
tried to procure Paula Miller as a witness for Miller's trial but that she wouldn't come then 
because she had a son in criminal trouble at the time and needed to be there to support him (R. 
159 at 3). Although trial counsel did obtain a continuance when having trouble obtaining 
hospital information from Louisiana, counsel did not attempt to get a continuance of the trial in 
order to find a date which Paula Miller could/would attend (R. 25-27). 
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trial even though there would have been no reasonable strategic decision for not doing so. 
The court hearings in Louisiana involved charges for commercial fishing without a 
license, a crime for which there would have been very little, if any, risk of prejudicing the 
jury compared to the weight of the evidence showing Miller's presence in Louisiana just 
three days prior to the offense in this case. A certified copy of said record would have 
been admissible at trial. 
Another example is the records of River West Home Health showing that Miller 
was visited by a Home Health employee on November 29, 2000 and December 1st, 7th, 
and 14th, 2000. Trial counsel knew, or should have known of the existence of said 
records/testimony as evidenced by Miller's testimony during trial that he had a nurse 
come by the house to help with his speech (R. 158 at 108). Said records, which would 
have been admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, or through 
testimony of a Home Health employee(s). Said evidence would have been invaluable to 
Miller's alibi defense as it would have showed Miller's presence in Louisiana, by an 
independent unbiased source, one day prior and six days after the offense in question, and 
<would also likely have shown Miller's physical condition following the stroke and his 
capability, or lack thereof, to travel long distances. 
Three, trial counsel failed to file a written notice of his intention to claim an alibi 
defense pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-14-2 which would have been necessary to 
introduce said witnesses and evidence above. 
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Miller asserts that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance because he was 
denied an opportunity to adequately present an alibi defense because witnesses and 
evidence were not properly investigated and/or procured and/or introduced at trial. 
Finally, Miller asserts that a Rule 23B remand is the only way to cure the deficiency in the 
record created by his trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Without a remand Miller will be 
greatly limited in his arguments on appeal and prejudiced by this Court's inability to 
address all of his claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that, based upon the deficiencies in the record on 
appeal caused by trial counsel's ineffectiveness, this Court remand this matter to the 
Third District Court for an evidentiary hearing and the entry of findings of fact relating to 
the alleged claims of ineffectiveness by trial counsel. 
DATED this jElTday of August, 2004. 
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Hearing Excerpts In Re: SB 16, Exoneration and Innocence Assistance 
Seiu Bell (0:11): This is an exciting bill Mr. President. Um, I'm very pleased to be 
able to present it to the uh, body this year. It passed uh, unanimously through our 
judiciary uh, interim committee. Uh, we had compelling testimony concerning this bill. 
Uh, as you know, with the emergence of DNA uh, evidence, we've been able to uh, more 
accurately uh, marshal evidence and therefore convict people properly, but also to 
exonerate people. And this state has uh, has embraced exoneration through DNA 
evidence. This uh, is a little different bill in that it follows the pattern of the DNA 
exoneration and adds an element of compensation. Uh, what this bill does is state that a 
person who is found factually innocent, not technically, but factually innocent of a charge 
uh, after the uh, person has been found guilty, will be exonerated, meaning uh, it'll be 
ruled as though the uh, the uh, uh, crime had never been uh, the, the accused had never 
been convicted. And so the conviction will be overturned. A problem has arisen 
nationally as people have been exonerated and, and think about this, what could happen. 
Well uh, the example we had was a policeman who had, in Rhode Island who had some 
connection with the victim of a murder, was somehow found to be guilty of the murder. 
Well later the boyfriend of the victim came forward, confessed to the crime, it was 
corroborated and it was very clear that the man who had uh, lost his ability to be a police 
officer, lost his uh, uh livelihood, had spent several years in jail uh, was, was factually 
innocent. This is not a technical, constitutional type of, of a reversal, but, but a factual 
innocence test. And so as he came and testified to us, we saw the justice of, of this kind 
of thing and there's a, a project nationally to get these kinds of uh, bills adopted 
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throughout the nation and the, the leading person here is a young woman whose mother 
was convicted of murder and served uh, twenty, over twenty-five years for the murder. 
And uh, as a sixty-six, sixty-seven year-old woman, was freed from prison. Well, people 
like that across the nation uh, obviously are outraged and they, they uh, can stage a pretty 
compelling case to a state for why they should be compensated. And so they've sued or 
they've gone to the legislature. Legislatures in some cases have awarded multi-million 
dollar awards. You can imagine a young person who's been deprived of earning 
capacity, of family, of reputation, of education, of these uh, benefits we all take for 
granted and then are cast back out in society without resources, without the ability to 
make a living, without retirement. Uh, they can make a compelling case to the legislature 
and have been awarded multi-million dollar awards. Well, the problem with that is that 
there's no uh, equality or equivalency if you will, there's no system by which these folks 
are compensated. And so trying to get ahead of the curve, and we're talking a fractional 
number of cases here. Uh, we have adopted in this bill a uh, compensatory system and 
it's, it's fairly modest, but what it is, is uh, establishing the annual average wage, which is 
about thirty-five thousand dollars for uh, the average annual uh, income of a worker in 
the state of Utah. And one who is uh, who qualifies for this, um, let's see, will receive 
um, that amount of wage, about thirty-five to forty thousand dollars for each year spent in 
prison and a, a like amount for each year spent on death row, uh, to the maximum of 
fifteen years, is my memory. Uh, so, we felt like this was a modest uh, but foresighted, 
farsighted way in which to address these problems. It will be equivalent across the board 
so that uh, one person who makes some uh, very attractive claim to a legislature doesn't 
hit the lottery while someone who doesn't have those resources is left without. It also uh, 
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avoids lawsuits because persons who were wrongly convicted who can show 
prosecutorial misconduct or something, are foreclosed from that because this would be, 
basically a worker's compensation-type compensation system rather than a hit-the-lottery 
system. So uh, that's my explanation of the bill and I'd be happy to answer any 
questions, Mr. President. 
Sen, Bell(15:28 ): Mr. President uh, in summation let me just mention two further 
points that have been raised in the debate. Um, first of all, the burden is clearly, if you 
look at line 271, the burden is on the uh, petitioner. So the fact, the mere fact that the uh, 
the prisoner has been released from jail does not establish the right to have a, a claim 
under this fund. Uh, the burden, in line 275, is upon the petitioner to establish the 
petitioner's factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. That is a very, very high 
standard. And the court, considering all the evidence and circumstances, then has to 
make a determination that the prisoner is factually innocent. He can't be on jail for some, 
in jail for something else. Uh, he has to be factually innocent of this claim. It's a very 
high standard and so we, we anticipate it will be sparingly used. The second thing, I 
think I need to uh, to correct an impression I left relative to um, Senator Hickman's 
question. And that is uh, on line 321 uh, while on line 316, the victim reparation office 
has to, to disperse these amounts, we're required to, to appropriate non-lapsing funds 
from the general fund uh, the next session after an award to keep the, the fund whole. 
Um I, I think it's interesting though that the payout uh, is not a lottery-type payout. If 
someone got a ten year uh, payout of, of uh, let's say three hundred fifty thousand dollars, 
you only get up to twenty percent of that front-end and the rest of it is dispersed over a, a 
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period of years so that it becomes a stream of, of minimal income. So, you know, this, I 
know we're kind of goosey about this sort of, of thing, but when you think about an 
innocent person having suffered on death row or otherwise, having deprived their life, 
liberty and, and happiness, it's, it's just a minimal kind of thing as a protection to this 
state against lawsuits and uh, and, and really uh, some claims that could be multi-million 
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